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For the second time in half a century the United States is engaged in a “cold war” with a 
powerful adversary—The People’s Republic of China.  Knowledgeable individuals, both military 
and civilian, on both sides predict conflict is likely if China continues to press forward with its 
present policies, policies that have strained relations between the two countries in the past and ones 
that the PRC shows no signs of abandoning. Included is an aggressive foreign policy in Asia, an 
unnecessary military buildup of staggering proportions, the threat to take Taiwan by force if it does 
not agree to unite with the Mainland, and a continuous denial of human and political rights to its 
citizens. The response of the United States to these policies and other areas of contention has been 
ambiguous; sometimes recognizing the threat to U.S. national interests and reacting positively; 
sometimes denying that an obvious threat exists. 
The question at the mid point of the year 2000 is whether a cold war does, in fact, exist and if 
so, why is it not recognized as such? The answer is not spelled out in black and white but in shades 
of gray. In this context, failure to acknowledge the existence of a cold war with the People’s Repub-
lic of China can be attributed to two main causes. 
First, the Clinton administration would vigorously deny that any such conflict existed. It 
would argue that in the long run a policy of forbearance in the short term will eventually lead to a 
more democratic and less aggressive PRC. Thus, espionage, sales of sophisticated weapons to rogue 
states, threats against Taiwan, repression in Tibet, a major military buildup with no enemy in sight, 
and the threat to target American cities with nuclear weapons should America interfere in a Taiwan 
Strait conflict, are viewed as only rough spots and best ignored, as China travels the road toward 
becoming a benign and peaceful member of the community of nations. President Clinton has labeled 
this policy as “constructive engagement.” 
A second, more obscure, but equally compelling reason is that the American public is not 
ready to accept the fact that we are again engaged in a cold war with another major and hostile 
military power. This trauma is not unlike that experienced by the British and French after the first 
World War. They paid a terribly high price in their victory and were unwilling to recognize Hitler’s 
Germany as a threat when all evidence pointed to the contrary. In essence, they were war weary and 
willing to rationalize any policy that would avoid another conflict. The parallel is plain enough. In 
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the 45 years following World War II the United States also paid a high price for its cold war victory 
over the Soviet Union in terms of its dead (Korea and Vietnam) and in national treasure expended. 
Also important was the high psychological cost paid. The ever present threat of a nuclear 
holocaust, the Cuban missile crisis, surrogate wars in Africa, Central America and Afghanistan, and 
daily headlines pointing out areas of disagreement with the Soviet Union that could lead to conflict. 
All of this took its toll. Simply put, Americans by and large are not willing to so soon give up a 
peace won at so high a cost and embark on another cold war struggle. 
A positive reaction to the PRC’s threat to use force against Taiwan was the House passed 
“Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,” legislation which would allow the United States to sell state of 
the art military technology and equipment to Taiwan.  This was an essentially a Republican bill and 
was vigorously opposed by the Clinton administration. On the other hand, a Republican Congress 
granted permanent most favored nation status to China with respect to trade between the two coun-
tries. Such contradictions can only confuse public opinion and give comfort to those who deny 
reality and pursue peace at any price. 
But if a cold war with the People’s Republic of China exists as argued here, then the United 
States must recognize it as such and strive to prevail in the shortest time and at the least cost. And 
while another 45 year long cold war is not acceptable, it is quite reasonable to believe that China can 
be changed into the kind of country that the Clinton administration envisages and in a much shorter 
time frame. The paramount consideration is that the United States face reality. What if Britain and 
France had recognized the threat posed by Hitler in the run up to World War II and accepted the risk 
of positive action. One can only speculate but it seems fair to conclude that no matter what the 
outcome, it would have been a thousand times preferable to the known cost of six years of world 
conflict. 
What can the United States do to end the cold war with the PRC quickly and on favorable 
terms, that is, the establishment of a democratic and non-threatening China. In this respect the 
United States must: 
• Explain its position and rationale to potential allies and also be prepared to accept 
that many of its traditional friends will oppose a more confrontational policy 
toward China. e.g. the European Union. 
• Counter PRC diplomatic efforts to secure actual and de facto mutual security 
agreements with neighbors with which it has fought border wars in the past— 
Russia, India, Vietnam. In other words use all the tools of diplomacy and persua-
sion to deny the PRC secure borders in its cold war struggle with the United 
States. 
• Make clear its absolute determination to defend Taiwan against a military attack 
by the PRC, and further, initiate direct contacts between the Taiwan and U.S. 
military. 
• Increase its military capabilities in the Western Pacific and, by definition, signifi-
cantly increase overall military spending. While the cost will be initially high, it 
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will be more than offset by a democratic and non-threatening China down the 
road. A second, and not insignificant benefit, would a large reduction in military 
expenditures by nations in East Asia. 
• Make a major, full press effort to bring Russia and Japan to an agreement over the 
Kurile Islands followed by mutual security and trade agreements. 
• Make clear to China that every provision in the recently passed most favored 
nation trade agreement will be strictly enforced and that riders to the legislation 
monitoring certain aspects of Chinese behavior are as important as the legislation 
itself. And further, the first violation of the agreement by China will bring about 
swift and effective retaliation. 
• Make clear that any threat, overt or convert, to America’s East Asian allies and de facto 
allies—Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Singapore—will be considered a threat to 
U.S. security. 
• Write into law as necessary and strictly enforce prohibitions against the export of militar-
ily useful technology/equipment to the PRC. 
Implementing the above will be an exercise in “hard love” and will not be easily embraced 
by the American public. But it also should be noted that President Reagan’s strategy for ending the 
cold war with the Soviet Union on American terms was not without its critics. Insuring that a totali-
tarian China does not dominate Asia, as Germany planned to dominate Europe, is not without risk. 
But then, what are leaders for? 
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